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ABSTRACT 
Between. 1 January 1996 and 30 June 2001 takeovers in New Zealand were governed 
by a set of regulations that formed part of New Zealand Stock Exchange ("NZSE") listing 
rules . The NZSE rules were relatively light in their approach to governing takeovers and 
received much criticism throughout their tenure. Prior to 1 January 1996 takeovers had 
been regulated by the Companies Amendment Act 1963. 
We examine the returns to targets and bidders between 1 January 1990 and 30 June 
2000 to determine how effective the rules were in promoting shareholder wealth . The 
change in regulations between 1995 and 1996 also presents an opportunity to examine 
the impact on returns from moving from a lightly regulated regime to one which is more 
regulated with a greater amount of required disclosure. 
We find that returns to both targets and bidders were lower under the NZSE regime than 
under the Companies Amendment Act 1963. This result is attributed to several specific 
aspects of the Companies Amendment Act 1963 such as the ability of the target to 
recover defense costs from bidder and a set period for which the offer must remain 
open. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Takeovers are, and will continue to be, emotive and controversial events . They provoke 
a wide range of emotions from parties such as the general public, aggrieved 
shareholders, embattled management, the media, and politicians. This is 
understandable given the sums of money at stake are usually in the millions of dollars, 
and people's livelihoods are at stake since takeovers frequently lead to redundancies. 
Management can be aggrieved due to the belief that the takeover bid undervalues their 
company, or that projects that enhance shareholder value have not yet reached fruition. 
Alternatively they may simply be trying to retain their perquisites. Shareholders may be 
upset that they were not able to participate in the premium for control, or that they are 
effectively locked into the company at a discount after a partial takeover. Politicians view 
takeovers as causing large scale redundancies, or see valuable "national" assets being 
sold to foreign companies . 
The takeovers debate in New Zealand has been raging for over a decade, and has 
been centered on the adequacy of the regulations controlling the process. There are 
two sides to the debate. One side argues that strategic parcels of shares are inherently 
more valuable, and thus should command a premium for control that other shareholders 
should not necessarily receive. This side argues that takeovers are economically 
important for any economy since they remove entrenched/inefficient management and 
re-deploy resources to higher valued uses. As such takeover regulation should promote, 
not restrict, takeovers . The other side of the debate argues that all shareholders own the 
assets of the company, thus all shareholders should have the opportunity to participate 
in takeovers. This side also argues that large shareholders often have an unfair 
advantage in being able to sell their shares in a takeover situation. 
The debate has been sparked (periodically) by controversial takeovers . Arguably the two 
that have received the most attention were the takeover of Lion Nathan Limited by Kirin 
Breweries in 1997, and the takeover of Montana Group Limited by Lion Nathan Limited 
in 2001. Both were partial takeovers and in both cases minority shareholders felt 
aggrieved that they were not able to share in the premium for control. The result of the 
pressure has been for the current Labour Government to announce the enactment of a 
takeovers code, which took effect from 1 July 2001 . This replaced rules governing 
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takeovers that were part of the New Zealand Stock Exchange listing rules. These rules 
were in effect from 1 January 1996. 
There was a substantial amount of debate leading up to the announcement of the new 
takeovers code. One of the criticisms prior to its announcement was that there was no 
substantial evidence on the performance of the previous set of rules . The aim of this 
research is to fill that gap (albeit belatedly) . 
We examine control transactions between 1 January 1990 and 30 June 2000. Our 
principal finding is that the stock exchange rules ("the rules") did not appear to enhance 
shareholder wealth from takeovers . Post-announcement returns were found to be lower 
for both targets and bidders under the rules than prior to 1996. This is at least partially in 
contrast to our expectations. We predicted that returns would improve for targets but 
deteriorate for bidders due to the increased cost of making a bid. When the rules are 
examined in isolation it is found that stricter rules (Minority Veto) provide better returns 
than lighter rules (Insider Only) . We also examine returns for full versus partial bids. Full 
takeovers are found to provide higher returns for both targets and bidders than partial 
acquisitions. 
Several structural influences are also examined, namely toeholds , managerial and 
institutional shareholdings following research suggesting that they play a role in 
determining the selection of the takeover rule. These factors may then influence 
takeover returns. Toeholds are not found to provide substantially lower (higher) returns 
to targets (bidders) , although returns are found to be higher for both bidders and targets 
when the bidder has a controlling stake than when it had no toehold or a toehold of less 
than 50%. Managerial and institutional shareholdings are found positively influence 
returns to targets and bidders, although the extent to which is mixed. 
Given that our primary findings are 
(1) the rules did not appear to enhance shareholder wealth in the event of a takeover; 
(2) that tighter regulations seem to increase shareholder wealth; and 
(3) full takeovers are preferable to partial takeovers in terms of returns: 
the new takeovers code may provide benefits to shareholders of targets and bidders. 
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The remainder of this study is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the rationale for 
this study and how it contributes to the existing literature on takeovers, both in a New 
Zealand and an international context. Section 3 provides an overview of takeover 
regulations in New Zealand . This section also covers the arguments for and against a 
mandatory bid rule . Section 4 reviews the existing literature on takeovers including 
various theories and empirical evidence. Previous New Zealand studies of takeovers are 
reviewed in Section 5. Section 6 then outlines the hypotheses tested by this paper. In 
section 7 we turn to the empirical methodologies used to test our theories. Sections 8 
and 9 provide the results of the event studies and the cross-sectional regressions 
respectively. Section 10 analyses the results and the implications from a regulatory 
context and Section 11 outlines ideas for further research. Section 12 concludes. 
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2 CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE 
Previous research on takeovers in New Zealand has concentrated on two areas. Firstly 
older literature examined returns generated by the takeover process and confirmed 
international evidence. Secondly, more recent papers have looked at factors that may 
have influenced the choice of the takeover regime under the rules. 
This research will make a contribution to the existing literature on takeovers in New 
Zealand in the following ways: 
2.1 The Impact of the NZSE Regulations 
The main aim of this research is to examine the effect of the rules on returns to targets 
and bidders complementing several recent studies.1 Takeover returns post-1996 will be 
compared to pre-1996 in order to determine the impact, if any, that the rules had on 
returns. The returns post-1996 will then be broken down according to the takeover rule 
that applied to the transaction. A previous study by Linklater (1998) looks at returns post-
1996 versus returns pre-1996. However her research suffers from an excessively small 
sample , and she does not consider the impact of partial acquisitions. Linklater (1998) 
also does not consider each of the three stock exchange rules in isolation. 
In recent years the NZSE rules have been subject to some intense criticism. The 
outcome of the debate has been the enactment of a new takeovers code, which came 
into force from July 1, 2001. However, whether or not the criticism of the NZSE rules 
was justified is unknown as there has been no research on the impact of the NZSE 
rules . This study hopes to shed some light on the relative performance of the now 
redundant stock exchange regulations that have governed takeovers in New Zealand to 
determine if there was substance behind the criticism. 
This research is also important in the wider context with the recent introduction of a 
whole new set of rules for governing takeovers. We analyse the impact of the 
introduction of regulations on takeover returns (i .e. New Zealand went from a relatively 
unregulated takeover environment pre-1996 to a more regulated environment post-
1996). Additionally, the three options within the NZSE rules allows us to compare the 
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effects on returns of relatively restrictive regulations versus liberal regulations in the 
same business environment and economic conditions. 
2.2 Partial and Full Acquisitions 
This study takes a broader look at takeovers than previous studies. It examines all 
change in control transactions (including increases) between 1 January 1990 and 30 
June 2000. For the purposes of this study a change in control transaction has been 
defined in two ways: 
1. An acquisition of stock that takes the acquirer above a total holding of 20%; and 
2. The acquisition of five percent or more of shares in any given year if the acquirer 
already holds in excess of 20% shares outstanding . 
These were known under the NZSE rules as a "restricted transaction". For the purposes 
of this research I define a partial acquisition as any acquisition of less than 100% that 
was a restricted transaction. By defining takeovers in these ways this research is able to 
take a broader examination of takeovers to include transactions where control of a 
company is passed, or strengthened. 
Previous research in New Zealand has generally examined only takeovers for 100% of a 
company.2 However when the purpose of the research is to examine the impact of 
regulations on returns to shareholders all change in control transactions should be 
considered in order to improve our understanding of the relationship between regulations 
and economic returns. In this study we are seeking to determine how takeover 
regulations affected shareholder returns, and contro l over the company's assets does 
not always change due to the purchase of 100% of the company's shares . If partial 
acquisitions are not considered then a vital piece of the jigsaw is missing. 
Additionally, one of the criticisms of the rules leading up to the enactment of the 
takeovers code was that small shareholders tended to miss out on participating in 
changes in control. In New Zealand partial regulations historically have been governed 
by the same set of rules as full takeovers. Therefore any difference in returns between 
partial and full is due to factors other than regulations . Other countries such as Australia 
and Britain have rules that deal specifically with partial acquisitions. If returns from partial 
1 Tapping et al (1998) and Berkman and Navissi (2000). 
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acquisitions are substantially lower than from full acquisitions then separate rules 
governing partial takeovers become necessary. 
2.3 Structural Influences and Takeover Regulations 
The third contribution of this research is the examination several structural influences on 
returns to shareholders over the period 1 January 1990 to 30 June 2000. These are 
toeholds, managerial and institutional shareholdings. Whilst these factors are not new, 
previous New Zealand studies on takeover returns have not considered all of these 
influences within the same model. Several previous studies touch on one or the other3. 
The link between these factors and the regulatory aspect of this study are two previous 
studies4 in New Zealand which show that shareholder structure influences the choice of 
rule . These factors could affect returns in the takeover situation, and as such it is 
considered to be important that we cross-sectionally control for them. 
2 Firth (1997) briefly touches on partial takeovers but does not examine the differences between 
rartial and full takeovers. 
For instance Mandelbaum (1993b) examines toeholds only, Firth (1997) examines institutional 
and managerial shareholdings as part of his research . 
4 Tapping et al (1998) and Berkman and Navissi (2000) . 
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3 TAKEOVER LEGISLATION AND THE NEW ZEALAND ENVIRONMENT 
In 2000 the Labour Government announced the implementation of a takeover code from 
1 July 2001. This section seeks to give an overview of some of the current takeover 
rules that applied in New Zealand, and the new legislation . 
3.1 Takeover Legislation 
Why regulate the takeover process at all? It has been recognized that shareholders are 
vulnerable under a takeover situation. They may have incomplete or inadequate 
information as to the offer, pressure may be placed on the target shareholders to sell 
their shares, or shareholders may be subject to the prisoner's dilemma.5 On the other 
side , management may take measures to frustrate the takeover purely to retain their 
position in the company and defeat what would have otherwise been an economically 
rational takeover from a shareholder's point of view. 6 
Internationally the approaches to takeover regulation differ sharply. For instance, in the 
United States the tender offer process is highly regulated by legislation. There are few 
restrictions on placing a bid, but management has a wide range of defensive devices to 
frustrate a potential raider. In the UK on the other hand, the takeover process is not 
regulated by legislation. Takeovers are governed by the City Panel on Takeovers and 
Mergers , which is an unincorporated body. Although the panel 's takeover code carries 
no legislative weight, it is supported by the courts . There are many restrictions on 
takeovers and partial takeovers are virtually prohibited . Defensive tactics are also 
heavily regulated. 7 
3.2 The Regulation of Takeovers in New Zealand 
The takeovers debate has raged in New Zealand since the late 1980s. Arguments have 
surrounded the premium for control and the rights of the minority shareholder. In 
October 2000 the Labour Government announced that it would implement a formal 
5 As noted by Bradley (1980). Two suspects of the same crime are placed in separate rooms. 
Neither knows if the other will confess to receive a lighter punishment. 
6 Ogowewo (1996). 
7 See De Mott (1988) and Ogowewo (1996) for further details on the similarities and differences 
of the two systems. A full analysis of the differences and similarities of the two systems is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
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takeovers code to be supported by the Takeovers Act 1993.8 This code is intended to 
give minority shareholders a better deal in a takeover. Prior to the new regulation 
takeovers in New Zealand were principally governed by the following pieces of 
legislation and rules9 : 
3.2.1 The Companies Amendment Act 1963 ("the act") 
Prior to the takeovers code becoming operational, this was the only piece of legislation 
that directly applied to takeovers in New Zealand. 10 It covered both listed and unlisted 
companies and applied to written offers to purchase shares where the bidder will control 
more than 20% of the voting rights. The legislation did not cover verbal offers or stands 
in the market. 
The major provisions of the legislation were 11 : 
1. Prior notice to target: a takeover offer shall not be made unless the bidder has sent 
the target a notice in writing of the offer including terms of the bid. 
2. Pause Period: the bidder must pause for at least 14 days between the date of the 
notice and the acceptance of shares. 
3. Obligation of the target: the target company must ensure that all of its shareholders 
are notified of the bid . 
4. Minimum acceptance period: the offer by the bidder to purchase shares must remain 
open for at least one month. 
5. Defence can be financed by bidder: the target may recover the costs of its defence 
from the bidder. 
The most common criticism of the act was that its provisions were very easily avoided as 
it does not cover stands in the market, oral offers, or offers to less than six shareholders. 
Watson (1996) notes that the Takeovers Panel described 39 listed companies in which 
control changed between February 1993 and April 1995, all of which avoided the act. 
Another criticism of the act relates to the provision that allows the costs of the targets ' 
8 Interested readers are referred to Fitzsimons (1996) and Watson (1996) for an excellent 
background to the development of takeover law in New Zealand. 
9 Please note that the sections on regulations are descriptive in nature and are not intended to be 
a complete analysis. 
10 Ibid Watson (1996) 
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defence to be recovered from the bidder.12 This provision makes the takeover process 
more costly from the bidders ' perspective and potentially lowers the probability of a 
takeover. The provision also increases the agency problem since it effectively aids the 
entrenchment of management. Finally, this provision also creates an incentive for target 
management to make the takeover as long and costly as possible as the costs will 
ultimately be borne by the bidder no matter what the outcome of the takeover contest. 
3.2.2 Section 4 of the New Zealand Stock Exchange ("NZSE") Listing Rules 
Section 4 (hereinafter referred to as "the rules") of the NZSE listing rules took effect from 
1 January 1996 and were made obsolete on 1 July 2001 by the Takeovers Code. 
Companies listed on the NZSE were required to adopt one of three options available to 
govern the takeover process in their constitution . The underlying theme of the rules is 
that a company's shareholders have the choice of how corporate control is transferred . 
Shareholders can choose from an option that allows control to be passed easily with the 
controlling shareholder able to receive the full premium for control , an option that takes 
the middle ground, or an egalitarian option that requires the premium for control to be 
shared amongst all shareholders. 
The rules governing takeovers were triggered either by: 
1. an acquisition of greater than 20% , or 
2. by a bidder who already has a stake greater than 20% and is increasing its 
shareholding by five percent or more in any one year. 
The three options were: 
(1) Notice and Pause: This was the standard provision governing a takeover. Bidders 
must give notice of their intention to bid and wait a set length of time before proceeding 
with the takeover. The bidder must give three days notice for a private bid, one-day 
notice for an on-market bid , and fifteen days for a bid by a company insider. 
11 Mandlebaum (1993c) 
12 Mandlebaum (1993c) 
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(2) Insider Only: This was the least restrictive of the rules and it was only applicable to 
takeovers made by company insiders. It is essentially a modification of the Notice and 
Pause regime. The only notice requirement under this rule is fifteen days in the case of a 
bid by company insiders. 
(3) Minority Veto : This regime is the most restrictive of the rules . The name is misleading 
in that the minority can not veto the bid , instead this rule operates as an equal price 
clause . All bidders must give a fifteen-day notice period . Any partial offers must be on a 
pro-rata basis. 
The Minority Veto regime is closest to the tender offers under the US system and to 
takeover rules in Australia , UK, and Canada. It should not come as a surprise that very 
few listed companies chose the Minority Veto option . Most stakeholders would wish to 
dispose of their stake at the highest premium achievable in the event of a bid . This set of 
rules could prevent large shareholders from receiving a larger control premium since any 
premium would have to be shared amongst all shareholders. 
In addition , the NZSE rules made it difficult for this option to be chosen. In order to adopt 
the Minority Veto regime the provisions have to be approved by special resolution by two 
separate groups of shareholders with at least a 75% majority . The two groups are all 
shareholders with holdings of greater than ten percent and those with holdings of less 
than ten percent. 
In addition to establishing regulations that lightly govern takeovers, the NZSE 
established a set of rules that tightly governs the means by which takeovers may be 
contested. These rules prevent defenses such as poison pills and poison puts . 
In general, the rules are biased towards increasing the occurrence of takeovers by 
removing barriers to takeovers and reducing the costs of mounting a bid. Given that 
defensive tactics are prohibited as well , the playing field is tipped significantly in favour 
of the bidder. This is in contrast to the United States where there is little regulation 
governing bids, but targets, as stated earlier, have a wide range of methods with which 
to defend a bid . The United Kingdom on the other hand has laws to restrict how bids 
take place, but also restricts defensive activity. 
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Therefore it would appear that takeover legislation should take a stance on whether bids 
are restricted or not and whether defensive tactics can be employed or not. The two 
sides are mutually exclusive. Bids should not be heavily restricted and not defensive 
tactics, or visa versa (as is the case with the previous New Zealand rules). 
3.2.3 The Takeovers Act 1993 
Until 2001 this act had no legislative value in New Zealand since the takeovers code that 
accompanied it was deferred as a result of political pressure. The principle purpose of 
the act is to formulate a code to govern takeovers. The Act has five objectives , which 
are: 
1) "to establish a Takeovers Panel to formulate a code for takeovers for specified 
companies"; 
2) "to empower the Panel to define the transactions where the Code applies and nature 
and content of the rules applying to those transactions"; 
3) "to empower the Minister of Justice to decide whether to advise the Governor-
General to approve the Code or alternatively defer the decision"; 
4) "to provide the Code will have force of law if approved by the Governor-General "; 
5) "to provide for the administration and enforcement of any operative Code". 13 
3.3 The Takeovers Code ("the Code") 
The Code was submitted by the Takeovers Panel in October 2000, and came into force 
on 1 July 2001 . The Code applies to companies listed on the New Zealand Stock 
Exchange, and companies that have 50 or more shareholders and greater than $20 
million of assets. 
The Code has stirred up a large amount of controversy. 14 Proponents claim that it will 
enhance the rights of minority shareholders, strengthen the reputation of the New 
Zealand Stock Exchange and increase local investment in the New Zealand Stock 
Exchange. Proponents also blame the rather lack-lustre performance of the NZSE 
compared to its international counterparts on the lack of protection for minority 
1 Ibid Watson (1996) pp 319 - 320 
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shareholders ansIng from having no takeovers legislation. This is a very strong 
statement to make and it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove or refute 
conclusively . However there has been some circumstantial evidence. A survey of 
institutional investors by Merrill Lynch suggested that a higher risk premium was placed 
on New Zealand stocks because there was no formal takeovers legislation in place. 15 
The key provision of the Code requires a mandatory bid be made to all shareholders 
when any party increases their shareholding above 20% of outstanding shares. The bid 
may be a full bid or a partial bid for at least 50% of the shares and the price offered must 
be the same for all shareholders. An equal offer must be made to all company 
shareholders on a pro-rata basis in the event of a partial bid . The Code also continues 
the prohibition on defensive activities by management of the target-company. 
The Code is based on the code in force in Australia in an effort to align the takeover 
legislation of the two countries, and also to give minority shareholders a "better deal" . 
The Code is also similar to that applying in the United Kingdom and various other EC 
countries such as Germany and Switzerland. The overriding principle of the Code is 
equal treatment. The principal of equal treatment is based on the premise that all 
shareholders own the company's assets and as such all shareholders should share in 
the premium for control. The Code also aims to increase the participation of 
shareholders in control transactions. In the letter to the Minister of Justice dated 8 June 
1995 the Takeover Panel stated: 
"As its principal thrust, the Code seeks to promote the contestability of corporate control 
through workable and effective takeover activity and , at the same time, provide an 
increased measure of participation and equal treatment for shareholders."16 
A mandatory bid to all shareholders, whether on a pro-rata basis or a full basis, ensures 
that minority shareholders are able to participate in a change of control transaction . It is 
noted that bids below the 50% threshold are allowed if a shareholder vote approves the 
transaction . Additionally, an acquirer can purchase a block of shares that will take it into 
14 There have been numerous articles in several newspapers citing these arguments. See for 
example The Dominion September 6, 2000 and The Dominion October 18, 2000. 
15 Refer Guardian Trust's submission to the Takeovers Panel. 
16 Letter to the Minister of Justice, 8 June 1995, page 5. 
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a majority position without making a formal offer to all shareholders if this transaction is 
approved by a majority of disinterested shareholders. This legislation allows all 
shareholders the ability to participate in change of control transactions. 
3.4 Arguments for and against the Code 
One of the main arguments against the Code is that it will increase the costs of a 
takeover both in terms of actual costs and the amount of the investment required since 
not all control transactions would have taken the acquirer to a holding at least 50%. 
Opponents argue that the Code will stifle takeover activity in New Zealand 17 , protect 
inefficient management from the threat of removal posed by takeovers, and result in 
resources being applied to less efficient uses. Opponents of the Code also argue that 
large shareholdings are worth more commercially, that large shareholders take greater 
risks , expend greater resources in researching the target , and make a proportionately 
larger contribution to the company. As such they should be entitled to greater returns. 
There is little doubt that larger shareholdings are worth more commercially given that 
they frequently represent control over assets. However risk is defined as variance in 
returns, and thus all shareholders in a company are exposed to the same risk 18 . It could 
also be argued that the large shareholders' monitoring is also in their own best interests. 
This is because monitoring reduces their portfolio risk, and large shareholders are better 
informed as to when to make an investment or exit decision. One could also argue that 
small shareholders are more exposed to loss than institutional shareholders. This is 
because a) they could have a higher proportion of their wealth tied up in the shares, b) 
they lack the knowledge and sophistication of the institutional shareholders , and c) they 
could be inadequately diversified. It is noted that the above arguments do not fit into the 
economic model of rationality, however they are commonly observed in real life. 
The opponents of the Code also argue that the US market does not have the mandatory 
bid provisions and takeovers work perfectly well without the provisions . However, as 
pointed out by the Takeovers Panel, the dispersion of ownership is higher in the US than 
in New Zealand . The NZSE in its submission to the Takeovers Panel stated that at least 
75% of companies have one owner of greater than 20%, and 50% of listed companies 
This point will be examined in greater detail in section 3.6 
18 Of course unsystematic risk can be diversified away to some extent, but systematic risk cannot. 
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have one owner of greater than 40%. Therefore in the NZ context it is easier for control 
to pass without minority shareholders becoming involved. The Takeovers Panel also 
points out that controlling shareholders in the US have fiduciary duties to minority 
shareholders, and these are support by courts . Equally important, and not seemingly 
recognized by the opponents of the Code, is the US markets enable target management 
to undertake a wide range of defensive actions to frustrate the bid. Thus the US market 
also has legislation which could be seen to restrain takeover activity, or raise the costs of 
a takeover. 
The center of the arguments is the premium for control. Should the premium for control 
be received by large investors or should it be spread amongst all shareholders in the 
company? This is one argument that is unlikely to be resolved in the near future as the 
two sides are polarized . Opponents of the Code claim that large parcels of shares are 
worth more, whilst proponents argue that all shareholders have claims to the assets of 
the company. One significant problem is that it has been observed in New Zealand that 
institutions with holdings that are not strategic in nature are often able to jump the 
queue. This was the case with the Lion Nathan / Montana takeover19 this year where 
institutions were able to sell at higher prices and ahead of many small shareholders. 
Critics are not able to justify this behaviour with the argument that larger shareholdings 
are worth more. 
The mandatory bid provision could also have the effect of encouraging free-riding 
behaviour by minority shareholders to a greater extent than already exists. This is 
because the minority shareholders know in the event of a takeover occurring they will 
obtain a share of the returns. Therefore no incentive exists to undertake monitoring 
when these costs will be borne by larger shareholders. Previously they would probably 
have only participated in a takeover in the event of a full bid and even then they would 
not have been guaranteed receipt of the same price for their holding as the large 
shareholder(s)2°. One perceived problem with the mandatory bid rule is that if large 
shareholders are not able to exit at a premium it could encourage those shareholders 
Section 11 provides some background on this controversial takeover. 
20 All shareholders would have definitely received the same price only if the target had the 
Minority Veto rule in place. 
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with effective control to undertake dilution21 to increase their own returns and thus 
reducing the value of the minority. 
One of the key costs of the new Code will be that it will reduce the marketability of large 
blockholdings. Shareholders with holdings in excess of 20% will find it more difficult to 
sell those holdings since any purchaser will inevitably be forced to make a bid for the 
whole company. Even if the potential acquirer was to make a pro-rata bid for in excess 
of 50% it is unlikely that the existing major shareholder would be able to completely exit 
their investment. The last alternative is to have the transaction subjected to a vote of 
disinterested shareholders. It is conceivable that the transaction could go ahead in this 
event given shareholder apathy, or that the minority shareholders could see benefits 
associated with the new shareholder such as market power, economies of scale , 
expertise etc. 
Another argument frequently advanced against the new Code is that it provides no 
shareholder choice. The NZSE rules give shareholders the ~hoice of three regimes as 
outlined earlier. There is no choice under the Code, nor is there an opt-out provision . 
However to include an opt-out provision would be inconsistent with the very notion 
under-pinning the Code - fairness to all shareholders. Majority shareholders would be 
able to use their position to force an opt-out. In addition , the author is not aware of many 
places in the world22 where shareholders can choose their takeovers code. In general 
since "one size fits all" in other countries around the world with much larger companies , 
sharemarkets, and economies, why should New Zealand be an exception? It could be 
argued that New Zealand is a unique environment, however this equally applies to every 
country and most do not allow opt-out. In addition, one could also ask: just because I 
don't like the speed limit because it is too slow, does that mean if enough other people 
also object should we be allowed to opt-out of that law? 
In the sense of Grossman and Hart (1980). 
22 It is noted that the Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310 permits an opt-out decision. However it 
appears that the motivation behind the legislation was not so much as to promote fairness 
amongst shareholders, but to allow management to concentrate on long-term financial 
performance instead of short-term performance, and to protect shareholders, workers, and 
communities from the effects of hostile takeovers. 
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3.5 Arguments behind a mandatory bid regime. 
Luttman (1992) notes four arguments in favour of a mandatory bid rule. These are (1) to 
prevent a "stampede" in the event of a partial takeover bid , (2) equal opportunity to 
receive the takeover premium, (3) to provide an exit option, and (4) the possibility of 
future dilution activities by new majority holder. 
The first argument in favour of a mandatory bid proposed by Luttman (1992) is that 
partial bids can be highly coercive, especially when they are front-end loaded or two-tier 
bids, and when they are on a first come first served basis. 23 However this pressure can 
be removed simply by regulating the structure of partial bids, for instance prohibiting 
proportional partial takeovers and increasing disclosure requirements . Thus this 
argument does not create a necessary condition for the mandatory bid rule. 
The second argument in favour of the mandatory bid rule is philosophical in nature. The 
argument rests on the principal that the company's assets are owned by all 
shareholders. Thus all shareholders should be entitled equal opportunity to participate in 
any premium received for those assets. The other side is the argument based on 
Grossman and Hart (1980) , minority shareholders free-ride off the monitoring of the 
large shareholder, thus they incur none of the costs of monitoring but share in the gains. 
The equality principle is where the underlying philosophy of the regime in the US and UK 
depart.24 Both jurisdictions have equal price provisions in place to ensure all tendering 
shareholders receive any increase in price . However the regime in place in the UK goes 
further by ensuring that all shareholders have equal opportunity to participate in the 
takeover premium , there is no such compulsion in the US. 
The third argument in favour of the mandatory bid rule is that the new controlling 
shareholder may make changes to the company such as the line of business that the 
company operates in25 . The remaining minority shareholders may not necessarily agree 
to the structural change and wish to use their funds for another purpose. However after 
23 The coercive effects of a partial takeover bid will be further discussed in Section 4.5.5 of this 
~aper. 
4 Refer to Ogowewo ( 1996). 
25 This has been a frequent occurrence in New Zealand. A recent example was the reverse 
takeover of New Zealand Petroleum Ltd ("NZP) by Blue Cross Elder Care Ltd . The business of 
NZP was subsequently changed after the takeover from petroleum to operating retirement 
homes. 
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the takeover of the company has taken place their exit options may be severely limited 
due to lower share prices or reduced liquidity of the company's stock. This is especially 
relevant in the New Zealand market, which does not have the depth of most overseas 
markets, and where many stocks are only thinly traded . As a result dissenting 
shareholders may not be able to exit after a major change in corporate strategy. Luttman 
(1992) points out that an alternative solution of allowing shareholders to vote on the 
transaction could have the effect of blocking transactions that are economically rational. 
However she is referring to German corporate law which requires unanimous voting 
procedures. The alternative to this is to have non-interested parties vote with a majority 
rule decision. This argument creates strong grounds for participation of all shareholders 
in a change in control transaction. 
The last argument proposed by Luttman (1992) in favour of the mandatory bid rule is 
based on the possibility that a new controlling shareholder may extract value from the 
company through activities such as selling assets to themselves at lower than market 
cost, or selling product to himself at favourable rates. Grossman and Hart term this as 
"dilution" . The mandatory bid rule enables shareholders to exit if they think that the future 
value of the firm could be reduced as a result of the change in control. 
3.6 Could the mandatory bid rule stifle takeover activity? 
As mentioned in section 3.4, one of the arguments frequently advanced against the 
mandatory bid rule is that the market for corporate control provides a threat to 
management to perform or risk losing their position after the company is taken over. Any 
legislation that increases the costs of a takeover or makes it more difficult for a takeover 
to occur could lower the amount of takeover activity and reduce the effectiveness of the 
takeover as a means of corporate governance. This section provides arguments against 
that view. 
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3.6.1 Nothing New 
The first counter argument is that the mandatory bid rule is nothing new. It is operational 
in the UK, Australia , Germany, Hong Kong and Singapore as well as other countries. 
This author is not aware of empirical evidence that the mandatory bid rule has reduced 
takeover activity in these countries . Indeed DeMott (1988) reports the observation that 
takeover activity had not decreased under the takeovers code operating in the UK. 
3.6.2 Disciplining Inefficient Management 
It is has been proven that takeovers do provide a means of disciplining poorly performing 
managers and reallocating resources to higher value uses. Although there is mixed 
evidence, Agrawal and Jaffe (1999) reach the conclusion that the inefficient 
management hypothesis26 holds where the takeover is likely to be disciplining 
management. However, takeovers are frequently a last resort: shutting the gate after the 
horse has bolted. There have been many instances in New Zealand corporate history 
(and probably worldwide) of value being destroyed without companies being taken over 
such as Brierley Investments Limited and Fletcher Challenge. Although Fletcher 
Challenge is currently in the process of selling off divisions and returning funds to 
shareholders, this is being done voluntarily and not as the result of a hostile bid .27 In 
addition , New Zealand is a much smaller market and has not witnessed takeover waves 
such as have occurred in the US. 
3.6.3 Does Increased Costs Necessarily Mean Less Takeovers? 
The other part of the argument against the mandatory bid rule, that it will increase costs 
of a takeover and reduce the number of takeovers occurring, can also be argued 
against. There is some empirical evidence in the matter of anti-takeover legislation and 
its impact on the frequency of takeovers, although it is all in the US setting . Pound 
(1987) provides evidence that the adoption of anti-takeover amendments adversely 
impacted on the frequency of takeovers. Pound (1987) examines a sample of 100 NYSE 
listed companies that adopted supermajority and classified board amendments between 
26 Agrawal and Jaffe (1999) have an excellent review of the literature on this topic in Appendix A 
of their paper. 
27 There has been a rather harsh criticism in the media that Fletcher Challenge is liquidating its 
assets because it is unable to provide its shareholders with an adequate rate of return. 
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1973 and 1979. He compares this to a control sample of firms in the same period and 
finds a significant difference in frequency of takeovers between the two groups. 
However, in a more comprehensive study Comment and Schwert (1995) argue that 
antitakeover measures were not directly responsible for the decline in takeovers during 
the late 1980s, despite the widespread adoption of antitakeover devices. 28 Comment 
and Schwert (1995) estimate a probit model of takeover probability for a period from 
January 1977 to January 1991, and including 21 ,887 firm years. Their model yields 
positive coefficients for control share laws and business combination laws indicating that 
antitakeover laws do not deter takeovers. 
28 Comment and Sch we rt ( 1995) review the evidence of prior studies of takeover deterrence and 
find that the only consistent explanation of deterrence has been size. Other variables such as 
leverage, Tobin 's Q etc have yielded mixed results. 
27 
